Materialism and the Loss of Sovereignty: Ireland in the Celtic Tiger and After by White, Timothy J.
Materialism and the Loss of Sovereignty:  
Ireland in the Celtic Tiger and After
Timothy J. White  
Xavier University (<white@xavier.edu>)
Abstract:
Ireland’s status as one of the most materialist states in Europe in the 1980s 
helped motivate the need for economic growth. Ireland’s export oriented 
policies emphasized foreign direct foreign investment. Thus, Irish growth in 
the 1990s was based on integrating the Irish economy in the world market 
to satisfy the demand for a higher quality of life even if this compromised 
Ireland’s long struggle for independence and autonomy. Ireland’s depend‑
ence on international markets became even clearer after the financial crash. 
The Irish government required a bailout from the European Central Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund to cover the huge debt exposure 
the Irish government had assumed after guaranteeing bank debt. Hence, 
materialism served to motivate the rise and fall of the Celtic Tiger.
Keywords: austerity, Celtic Tiger, export‑oriented growth, financial 
crisis, materialism
Ireland’s eccentric place in the context of European development can be explained 
by a number of factors. Its peripheral geographic location contributes to under‑
standing Ireland’s historical development in the European context. Besides one 
notable exception most scholars believe Ireland was relatively untouched by the 
Roman Empire and its Celtic civilization continued with minimal interruption 
or external contact1. The Celts in Ireland were able to incorporate the founding 
of Christianity and survive a series of invasions by the Vikings. They were even 
to adapt initially after the arrival of the Anglo‑Normans. This settlement or 
invasion, however, ultimately led to an effort by English kings to bring Ireland 
under their domain and control. Not only did this bring Ireland into greater 
contact with others in Western Europe, but it also began the Irish effort to resist 
English imperial power. Thus, Ireland’s integration into Europe emerges from this 
colonial and anti‑colonial struggle. Despite great efforts and sacrifice to achieve 
independence from Britain, Ireland has always had to seek to accommodate its 
much larger and more powerful neighbor. Continental Europe offers the Irish 
a means of going beyond this relationship which has so dominated its history.
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1. Irish Economic Development after Independence
Thus, Irish economic development was built upon the fundamental reality 
that Ireland was an internal colony within the British Empire (Hechter 1975; 
McDonough 2005; Cleary 2006, 22‑35; White 2007). Because of the role 
Ireland played as an internal colony, its economy was oriented to produce 
agricultural products for the English market. Though Ireland’s economic 
underdevelopment in the nineteenth century was due to a complex set of cir‑
cumstances (Cullen 2012, 18), the Irish lacked the ability to govern themselves 
and develop their own economic policies after the Act of Union. According to 
Munck (1985) and Crotty (1986; 2011), British exploitation repressed and 
frustrated Irish economic development even after independence. 
While some may employ Marxist‑inspired analysis to explain Ireland’s 
historic poor economy, Ireland’s economic development is better explained by 
focusing on the political culture that emerged in the postcolonial period. The 
Irish from the 1920s through the 1950s were happy enough with the “frugal 
comfort” that the politicians of the era offered. An autarkic or self‑sufficient 
economic policy was intended to sever the historical economic relationship 
with Britain, thereby demonstrating Ireland’s independence, sovereignty, 
and autonomy. This economic policy coincided with the effort to rediscover 
if not reinvent a pre‑modern mythical Gaelic world that inspired Irish na‑
tionalism since the late nineteenth century (White 2004). As a result, after 
independence the Irish Free State experienced little economic growth, and 
the Irish economy remained primarily agricultural with few exports outside 
of this traditional sector2. The Irish sought industrialization following an 
import substitution strategy, minimizing their dependence on Britain for 
the import of industrial goods. The political dominance of de Valera in this 
era provided the Irish with a consistent set of nationalistic economic policies 
including protectionism and an economic war with Britain (Power 2009, 
13‑15). State resources were used to promote those values associated with de 
Valera’s exclusive conception of Irish nationalism. Economic policies reflected 
this nationalist vision and ultimately served to reinforce this postcolonial 
conception of identity (Daly 1992; Girvin 1997; Garvin 2004). Hence, this 
article builds upon Casey’s (2010, 8‑9) suggestion that the best way to un‑
derstand Irish economic development is to appreciate the cultural forces that 
first shaped Ireland in the postcolonial period and which ultimately drove it 
from its poverty to unprecedented growth, collapse, and the contemporary 
effort to overcome the financial crisis. 
2. Irish Economic Policies from the 1960s through the 1980s
When Lemass succeeded de Valera as Taoiseach in 1959, the Irish government 
embarked on a new program of industrialization and economic development 
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that unraveled the nationalist consensus in Ireland. Ultimately, de Valera 
failed to insulate Ireland from the Western liberal world. As first Irish elites 
and later the Irish masses became preoccupied with increased materialist 
demands, the traditional nationalism of de Valera lost its capacity to shape 
national economic policy. The Irish, like other postcolonial peoples, sought 
economic modernity. De Valera’s policies resulted in sluggish economic growth, 
the lack of industrialization, and high rates of emigration in the 1950s. The 
need to abandon these unpopular policies meant that more cosmopolitan 
values associated with globalization and rapid economic development became 
ascendant (Delanty 1994, 192‑197; Kinsella, Lyons 2011, 66, 69; McCabe 
2011, 192)3. Revisionist historians often accentuate the tension between 
traditional Irish nationalist policies and contemporary material aspirations. 
Their tendency to discount the nationalist ideal and forsake it minimizes the 
attractiveness of this ideal to a postcolonial people in the immediate aftermath 
of a long struggle to achieve independence. This does not mean that the initial 
appeal of postcolonial nationalism is likely to survive after the generation who 
fought for independence fades away. Nationalists who critique revisionism 
deny or overlook those aspects of traditional Irish nationalism that marginal‑
ized groups in society and prevented economic modernization. Nationalists 
need to confront the reality that liberalism has supplanted nationalism and 
is increasingly attractive to the Irish public (White 2002).
After de Valera’s departure as Taoiseach, Seán Lemass attempted to mod‑
ernize the Irish economy and recognized that the state needed to coordinate 
and promote economic development in an increasingly interdependent world 
economy4. Lemass realized that it was the state’s responsibility to satisfy the 
economic needs of citizens. By integrating the Irish economy with the others 
in Europe and the rest of the world, he necessarily unleashed forces that would 
change not only the standard of living of the Irish but also their priorities and 
values in life. As a late developer Ireland had to seek access to foreign invest‑
ment because there were not adequate domestic sources of capital to develop 
the economy. This strategy required effective use of foreign capital to propel 
economic growth and integrate foreign investment with local entrepreneurs 
and workers. The new strategy has been hailed by some because it took ad‑
vantage of Ireland’s entrance into the European Economic Community in 
the 1970s and its small domestic market (Jacobsen 1994; Sachs 1997; Barry 
1999). The entrance into what we now call the European Union brought 
not only access to large new consumer markets, initially for its agricultural 
products, but also subsidies that lasted for two decades that assisted Ireland 
in developing its infrastructure (MacSharry, White 2000, 39). 
In the 1960s the Irish economy grew quite rapidly, but the 1970s and 
1980s saw the Irish economy stagnate with high unemployment, fiscal deficits, 
a lack of investment, and resulting emigration (Power 2009, 28‑56). The oil 
shocks in 1973 and 1979 caused an inflationary ripple throughout the Irish 
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economy just as it did many other economies. This led to many other eco‑
nomic problems such as high interest rates, slower growth, and the resulting 
stagflation. Meanwhile, the materialistic mentality of the Irish proliferated as 
the material conditions in Ireland dramatically improved in the 1960s. Even 
though Irish economic performance stagnated in much of the 1970s and 1980s, 
values and attitudes continued to change. By the 1980s, the Irish had become 
one of the most materialistic national groups in surveys taken of member states 
in the European Union (Inglehart 1990, 91). The Irish public was no longer 
satisfied with the frugal comfort that de Valera had offered. They expected 
politicians to be able to deliver policies that raised their material standard of 
living, and there was great frustration with the Irish government’s inability to 
improve economic conditions. This explains the electoral volatility and frequent 
elections and transitions between governments in Ireland in the early 1980s. 
3. Changed Fiscal Policies and the Rise of the Celtic Tiger
By 1987 the problems of chronic high levels of unemployment, low growth, 
and high fiscal deficits reached a crisis in which Irish economic policy changed 
significantly incorporating neo‑corporatist strategies of the social partnership, a 
renewed effort to bring fiscal health to government finances, and encouraging 
growth through a new surge of foreign investment (Taylor 2005, 6‑9, 12‑14; 
Hardiman 2006; O’Donnell 2008; Sweeney 2008, 8‑9; Murphy, Devlin 2009, 
19‑20). Irish governments in the 1980s had come under increasing pressure as 
high unemployment and emigration undermined support for parties in power. 
Rising levels of consumption had lowered domestic savings (Arrow 1997, 5). 
This meant that foreign investment was increasingly critical to provide the 
capital necessary for economic growth and satisfying the growing demand 
for growth in the economy. The necessity to develop policies to match the 
material expectations of voters led the Irish government to combine fiscal 
discipline with a strategy to attract tourism and investment in pharmaceuticals 
and software. This policy took advantage of dramatically increasing flows of 
foreign capital that were emerging (Deeg, O’Sullivan 2009, 731). In this era, 
policy makers increasingly came to see the liberal world of growing trade and 
financial flows as the solution for growth and prosperity. The combination of a 
demonstrated government commitment and open market policies was critical 
to attracting foreign investment5. By the mid 1990s, these policies began to 
pay off with dramatic increases in Irish productivity, economic output, and 
material standard of living. Thus, it was the combination of globalization and 
policies that took advantage of the opportunities that globalization provided 
that best explains the economic success Ireland experienced in the 1990s 
(O’Sullivan 2010, 9). Ireland’s success demonstrates that states can develop 
national policies that take advantage of unique comparative advantages (Ca‑
poraso, Madeira 2012, 49).
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Ireland’s economic performance was nothing short of a miracle in historical 
perspective (O’Sullivan, Miller 2010). Th ere are many measures of the success of the 
Irish economy in the 1990s and continuing in the early 2000s. Gross Domestic Prod‑
uct (GDP) nearly doubled between 1995 and 2000. While Irish economic growth 
was not been as strong in the early 2000s as it was in the 1990s, annual real GDP 
growth continued to average more than six percent through 2007 (See Figure 1). 
Figure 1
Ireland’s growth came about because of rapid increases in productivity that far 
outstripped labor costs or wages (Krugman 1997, 42). Th is allowed Ireland to 
become a very appealing location for investment. Even with Ireland’s rapidly 
increasing population, this economic growth provided for signifi cantly higher 
incomes in Ireland. Th e number employed in Ireland nearly doubled from 1985 
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Th e eff ect of this rapid job growth included increasing labor force participa‑
tion, especially among women, and a replacement of the historic pattern of 
emigration with immigration (Walsh 2004)6.
Th e rapid expansion of exports accounts for much of the growth of the 
Irish economy in the 1990s. From 1991 through 2000 exports grew from 
just over €21 billion to more than €103 billion, almost quintupling in just 
one decade (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3
Th ere have been several reasons given for the growth of exports. Low corporate 
tax rates attracted foreign investment in export industries. A growing market in 
Europe meant products exported from Ireland would not face tariff s or other 
trade restrictions from fellow EU states. Irish government policy expanded 
education, especially in new sectors that were targeted to become part of the 
export sector like pharmaceuticals and Information Communications Tech‑
nology (ICT), and the fact that Ireland is a predominantly English speaking 
country which made it attractive to US investors7. Exports continued to grow 
throughout the fi rst seven years of the 2000s, but the pace of annual growth 
of exports slowed to less than 7% annually (see Figure 3). By the early 2000s, 
the Irish government had increasingly come to rely on a construction boom to 
spur economic growth to supplement the slower expansion of exports. 
Some have been critical of the export‑driven growth model the Irish 
government used to bring prosperity to Ireland. O’Hearn (1998; 2003), Fink 
(2004), Allen (2007), and Kirby (2010) have doubted this model’s capac‑
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capital which might be fleeting, and they criticized the Irish government’s 
deference to foreign corporate interests. Others have critiqued this model of 
economic modernization because of its reliance on tax breaks and incentives 
to attract foreign investment while neglecting to develop local industry and 
indigenous exports (McCabe 2011, 193).There have been other critiques of 
Ireland’s export‑led model of economic growth. Kirby (2005), for example, 
has argued that because of the economic inequalities and the lack of revenue 
due to low taxes, especially corporate taxes, Ireland does not have an adequate 
social policy8. Given the recent budget cuts in social services and forecasts of 
continuing tight fiscal conditions in Ireland for the next several years, critics 
contend that Ireland has squandered an opportunity to create an adequate 
safety net for its population. Thus, Ireland has become what Kirby identifies 
as a competitive state that has forsaken its social security rather than a devel‑
opmental state that is seen as more successful in terms of not only economic 
growth but generally higher living standards (Kirby 2005; Kirby, Murphy 
2008). Murphy (2009) has argued that Irish economic and social policies 
that have allowed the government to seek global capital and integrate Ireland 
with the global economy has weakened civil society. The social partnership has 
meant the weakening of civil society and the capacity for groups in society to 
organize for their own interests against the interest of the state.
Other critics focus more exclusively on the perceived growing income 
inequality (Kuhling, Keohane 2000; Tallon 2000; O’Hearn 2003; Hardi‑
man 2004; McVerry 2006; Nolan, Maître 2007; Kirby 2009). While not all 
shared equally in Irish economic success, income inequality has not changed 
significantly since the 1990s. Though the top one‑half of one percent of the 
population saw significant gains in their share of national income, almost all 
income groups saw little if any change in their share of the national income. 
Historically, Ireland has always had slightly higher levels of income inequality 
than others in Europe. The new wealth created during the Celtic Tiger was 
widely shared in society. Nevertheless, the persistence of one of the highest 
poverty rates in the European Union suggests that the Celtic Tiger did not 
ameliorate all of Ireland’s economic problems (Phádraig, Hilliard 2007).
Despite these criticisms, many continue to see Ireland as a state that suc‑
ceeded based on a strategy of attracting foreign capital and embedding it with 
local firms. The critical industry that has more than any other been responsible 
for the Celtic Tiger phenomenon has been pharmaceuticals and chemicals 
(White 2008). The Irish government has developed a strategy of attracting 
pharmaceutical companies to Ireland based on low taxes, a skilled and educated 
workforce with low labor costs, and market access to the rest of Europe (Van 
Egeraat, Breathnach, 2007; Glavanis‑Grantham 2008; O’Hearn, McCloskey 
2008). The chemical and pharmaceutical sector of the Irish economy has grown 
rapidly since the late 1990s. In relation to the nation’s total exports in 2011, 
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chemical and related products (including medicinal and pharmaceutical prod‑
ucts) accounted for more than 60% of all Irish exports (CSO 2012, 226‑227).
The other major sector of the Irish economy that has promoted rapid eco‑
nomic growth in the new global high tech economy has been Information Com‑
munications Technology (ICT) (Bradley 2002). This industry, like pharmaceuti‑
cals, takes advantage of low corporate taxes and a skilled and efficient workforce 
to attract foreign investment (Trauth 2000). The Irish government has played a 
key role in promoting this sector by seeking to attract investment, promote Irish 
companies, and invest in the education and training of its workforce. The result 
has been that Irish companies and facilities have been critical in developing a va‑
riety of specialized software. The importance of government policy to attract and 
develop this sector has been widely studied. The existing scholarship emphasizes the 
specific role government needs to play to not only attract foreign investment but 
link the foreign multinational with incipient local companies to provide industrial 
upgrading, innovation, and the creation of networks of technology development 
(O’Malley, O’Gorman 2001; Ó Riain 2004; Breznitz 2007).  
In addition, tourism has been a sector in which the state has invested 
and has been critical to economic growth in Ireland during the Celtic Tiger 
period (Clancy 2009; Zuelow 2009). The number of overseas tourists to 
Ireland grew steadily from 2002 through 2007 but has been declining each 
year since then through at least 2010, the last year for which we have data 
(CSO 2012, 246). Expenditures by tourists also grew from 2002 through 
2007, peaking that year at almost €4 billion. By 2010, spending by visitors 
had declined to less than €3 billion, almost a 25% decline in visitor revenue 
from its peak just three years earlier (CSO 2012, 247). The importance of 
tourism and other spillover sectors like construction is that they have offered 
employment opportunities to those in Ireland who do not possess the train‑
ing and skills associated with the high tech sectors of pharmaceuticals and 
ICT. In the years just before the collapse the financial sector also became an 
important element of Irish economic growth (White 2005; Reddan 2008; 
Power 2009, 200‑207). Taken together, the Irish took advantage of the grow‑
ing globalization in world markets, especially capital and trade and to a lesser 
extent labor, to propel their economy forward and experience unprecedented 
growth. Beyond specific policies, some argue that Irish culture provides a criti‑
cal asset in Irish economic growth (Bradley, Kennelly 2008). When one sees 
the excesses that developed in terms of the building boom and bust, however, 
one must recognize that the Irish entrepreneurial spirit became obsessed with 
consuming wealth more than just creating new products and services.
The surge in economic growth that occurred after 1995 as part of the Celtic 
Tiger phenomenon added new momentum to value change in Ireland. Increased 
female participation in the workforce, growing criticism of the Catholic Church 
and the loss of its moral monopoly9, a new era of immigration, and dramatically 
higher standards of living for many challenged much of the inherited value 
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structure of previous generations. What does it mean to be Irish and what do 
the Irish want were the questions that confronted a society amidst the challenge 
of liberalism and its meaning for the inherited national identity (White 2002). 
Thus, rapid social and economic change challenged a static or backward con‑
ception of identity and required the Irish nation to redefine itself (Mays 2005). 
While some had critiqued the form modernity took in Ireland and advocated 
for a culture that respected its past and heritage (Fennell 1993; Moriarty 2005), 
most were so focused on achieving, building, and buying that effective critiques 
of the materialism that had come to Ireland would have to wait.
4. Materialist Excesses and the Celtic Tiger
The prosperity of the Celtic Tiger period meant that the Irish had unprecedented 
disposable income. While some of the higher family incomes were used to pur‑
chase basic goods and helped many in Ireland achieve a higher material standard 
of living, much of the wealth of the Celtic Tiger was used for conspicuous con‑
sumption on items like big cars, electronic goods, and even helicopters. Some 
of this new wealth was also invested in land and construction (Coleman 2009, 
76‑78; Murphy, Devlin 2009, 32; Ó Dálaigh 2009, 45‑46). This resulted in 
a rapid acceleration of home prices, and building, especially in the residential 
sector, boomed. Developers built homes and used the initial payments for these 
homes to purchase more land and built even more homes. The leveraging in 
this process meant that the value of the developers’ properties far exceeded the 
cash that they used to secure loans for future developments. Because of the rapid 
process by which developers were buying land, selling houses, and reinvesting 
their profits, many of the developers were able to avoid taxation on their profits 
and emerge as an elite class with unparalleled wealth (O’Toole 2009, 82‑89). 
Cooper (2009, 238) identifies the investment in property and wealth built in the 
construction sector as the “development disease” of Ireland (Cooper 2009, 238).
Banks played an important part in the promotion of the construction sector 
by facilitating the credit developers and consumers needed even if they did not 
have as much collateral as had historically been required. The rise of Anglo Irish 
Bank, based primarily on loans to developers, put pressure on the long estab‑
lished Allied Irish Bank and the Bank of Ireland to liberalize their credit policies 
(Cooper 2009, 166). Irish banks became reckless in providing loans when the 
value of the collateralized property was so inflated based on the property bubble. 
The “profits” banks reported on debt that was increasingly leveraged provided 
for outrageous salaries, bonuses, and lifestyles for the executives of the major 
Irish financial institutions (Ó Dálaigh 2009, 73; Murphy, Devlin 2009, 167).
Typically, blame for the financial crisis has been attributed to bankers 
and developers and their coziness with corrupt or inept politicians (Chari, 
Bernhagen 2011), but corruption is not just caused by the actions of business 
and political elites but by a more general political culture which fails to place 
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normative restraints on corrupt political practices (Mungiu‑Pippidi 2013)10. 
Irish politicians, especially Bertie Ahern, may have been more preoccupied 
with the next election or dealing with his own personal financial crisis than 
creating sustainable economic growth policies for the long‑term (Leahy 2009, 
254‑256; Keena 2011), but the property bubble would not have happened 
if the Irish public had not encouraged politicians to pursue policies that 
were meant to satisfy their ever‑increasing material aspirations11. By 2006, 
many in Ireland came to believe that investment in land, development, and 
property were the signs of personal success. Many in Ireland participated in 
the building boom by purchasing most, if not all, of the houses built by the 
developers. In order to afford the rapidly escalating housing prices, consumers 
often purchased multiple homes increasingly borrowing with thirty‑five year 
zero percent down mortgages (Ross 2009, 141). Mortgage debt grew by 24% 
annually from 1996‑2006, and the total debt the Irish owned on home loans 
grew by 760% in this decade (Murphy, Devlin 2009, 40).
Hence, banks experienced exorbitant profits based on the highly inflated 
values of very questionable assets, both overvalued mortgages and loans to 
developers (Allen 2009, 8‑14; Ó Dálaigh 2009, 19‑28, 63‑108). By 2007 
banks began trading these bad debts among each other to hide the reality 
that they were losing money on mortgages rather than making spectacular 
profits (Murphy, Devlin 2009, 53, 146). Not only did this delay the aware‑
ness of the scale and nature of the financial problem, but it allowed bankers 
time to contrive means of securing their own personal assets amidst the rapid 
deterioration of the financial balance sheets of their institutions.
What role did government play in regulating and preventing or ame‑
liorating the financial collapse of the banks in Ireland? Instead of regulating 
and attempting to thwart the property bubble, government policy actually 
accentuated the problem. The government came to see the construction sector 
as a key elixir of growth necessary to sustain the Celtic Tiger. The continued 
growth of the construction sector was especially important to Bertie Ahern 
who needed the Irish economy to continue booming so that he could win 
a third term when the general election was to be held in 2007. When some 
economists such as Morgan Kelly at Trinity College voiced concerns regard‑
ing the escalating prices of property and the high probability that Ireland was 
entering a property bubble, Ahern dismissed these warnings as coming from 
those who challenged the new realities that the Celtic Tiger had created12. 
To be fair, few economists or commentators in the media dared to question 
Ahern’s assertions, not just because they feared Ahern’s wrath but the vast 
majority of the public in Ireland had bought into the speculation frenzy of 
the property bubble. Ahern and other politicians had convinced almost eve‑
ryone that Ireland lived under a new kind of economy where one need not 
worry about property bubbles or even consider the possibility of an end to 
the Celtic Tiger. In this political and economic environment, the government 
99materialism and the loss of sovereignty
continued to provide tax breaks and expand social welfare believing these were 
good policies and also good politics13.
Construction had become increasingly important as those employed in 
this sector grew rapidly. By 2006, one of four males was now employed in the 
construction sector (Murphy, Devlin 2009, 33; Ó Dálaigh 2009, 56‑58), and 
the government increasingly relied on stamp duty revenue that grew rapidly 
due to the rapid escalation of property prices and their sale (Ó Dálaigh 2009, 
58; O’Toole 2009, 120‑121). Th us, construction had become the sector critical 
to continued economic growth in Ireland, supplanting the role that had been 
played by pharmaceuticals and information technology. Government had be‑
come excessively reliant on revenue from the sale of escalating valued property 
and become accustomed to low social welfare costs due to high employment. 
Moreover, the government’s policies of maximizing home‑building as the means 
to solve the problem of rapidly escalating home prices resulted in government 
policy expanding the building boom. Th e government had hoped that when 
supply outstripped demand the cost of housing would fi nally become more af‑
fordable for middle and lower income Irish citizens. Unfortunately, their policy 
only served to increase the size of the housing bubble which fi nally burst in 2008.
Problems in the construction sector actually began in 2007 when housing 
prices dropped by 7.3%, but the government and many refused to confront 
the reality of dropping property values (Ross 2009, 173‑174). In 2007 the 
construction sector began to shrink at an annual rate of 13.5%. In 2008 the 
decline in construction had reached a rate of ‑29.1%. In 2009, construction 
declined by another 36.9%. In 2010 the collapse of this sector continued 
shrinking further by 29.9%, and the collapse began to slow somewhat in 2011 
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Th e number of newly built houses peaked in 2005 at 75,650 and had shrunk 
to only 9,075 by 2011 (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5
Moreover, the number employed in construction has dropped from 269,900 in 
2007 to only 105,700 in 2011. Since the beginning of the current recession in 
2007, there has been a total net job loss of 292, 600 through 2011 (CSO 2012, 
29). As a result, unemployment has skyrocketed from 4.7 % to 14.3% in this 
time period (CSO 2012, 31), and job losses in the construction sector account for 
56% of the reduced employment in Ireland (CSO 2012, 33). Construction has 
been the critical sector that has caused the recession in Ireland, and the economy 
of Ireland has shrunk by nearly 4% a year from 2007‑2011 (CSO 2012, 130).
5. Responding to the Financial Crisis and Recession
Even if we can identify a real estate bubble in the mid‑2000s built on greed as 
the initial cause of Ireland’s economic problems, this does not directly help to 
explain how the government reacted to the threatened collapse of the Irish bank‑
ing system in the fall of 2008. Clearly, the goal of the Irish government was to 
fi rst deny and then minimize the fundamental problems that the Irish economy 
faced due to a run on the banks and a lack of enough assets to support the Irish 
fi nancial system. Th us, the fi nancial crisis is now at the heart of Ireland’s current 
economic and fi scal crisis (Dellepiane, Hardiman 2012, 83). Th e tendency to not 
see warning signs and unacceptable risks before impending fi nancial crisis was 
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did not just make the banks look poorly managed and irresponsible, but it was 
clear that the government, while not fully aware of the economic consequences 
of the financial crisis and their decisions in this crisis, was well aware of what this 
crisis would mean politically. Both Fianna Fáil and the Greens, who were in a 
coalition government, had to know that this kind of bad economic news would 
cost them at the polls. When the election came in February 2011, the Greens 
lost all six of their seats in the Dáil and Fianna Fáil lost nearly 75% of their seats. 
Voters clearly based their election decision on the failure of these parties in the 
financial crisis and punished them at the polls (White 2011).
But if we look back to the fall of 2008 when the Irish government made 
the decision to provide a blanket guarantee for the debt carried by the banks, 
the politicians in power could not have foreseen the disastrous economic and 
ultimately political decision they had made. The government believed that 
Ireland’s economy required a stable financial system and that if the govern‑
ment did not bail out the banks, many other sectors of the economy would 
collapse as well (Cooper 2009, xi‑xvii; Murphy, Devlin 2009, 4; Leahy 2009, 
331‑334; Ross 2009, 193). While the excesses and questionable practices of 
Irish bankers could have been prevented by better regulation in the preceding 
decade, the global financial crisis exacerbated the banking crisis in Ireland by 
limiting the availability of credit on global markets and isolating the problem 
to Irish banks. The problem was that the debt that the Irish banks had ac‑
cumulated was highly linked to debt held by banks in several other European 
states. The failure to hold Irish banks responsible for the debts they had ac‑
cumulated could trigger a much wider financial crisis in Europe. That is why 
other European states, especially France and Germany, have been insistent 
that the debt accumulated by Irish banks must be repaid. In this way, one 
can see that the Irish financial crisis was linked to a global financial crisis, one 
which the Irish alone could not control14.
As a result of the collapse of the banks and the government takeover, the 
Irish government has taken control of the bad debts of the Irish banks and 
placed them under the National Assets Management Agency (NAMA). In 
order to prevent the collapse of the Irish financial system, the government (in 
reality the taxpaying public) has taken responsibility for the banks’ bad debts. 
NAMA has the unenviable job of liquidating the bad debt accumulated by 
Irish banks. This process will inevitably be painful for the taxpayer who will 
have to pay for the risks and in some cases outright corruption of Irish banks 
and their lending practices (Allen 2009, 140‑145). A bigger problem for 
NAMA is that its policies and transactions are cloaked in secrecy. Rather than 
allowing real estate transactions to be open and transparent, NAMA’s sale of 
assets is not public. This prevents the public from learning the price of assets 
and has contributed to the slow and continuing decline of real estate prices. 
Until the potential buyers know the true value of an asset, they continue to 
delay purchases and bottom out the real estate market. Prices continue to 
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drop. Thus, transparency and openness are critical to the revival of the real 
estate market in Ireland (Lyons 2010).
The most important impact of the financial crisis in Ireland and the 
government’s commitment to support the Irish banking sector has been a 
dramatic and sudden increase in the debt of the Irish government as well as 
a rise in the annual deficit. This dramatic increase placed increasing pressure 
on the value of Irish government bonds. By the fall of 2010, the markets 
showed little confidence in the Irish ability to pay their financial obligations, 
and the interest rates on Irish bonds soared. It became obvious that the Irish 
had lost their ability to finance their debt in the private market. As a result, 
the Irish government finally conceded to a bailout program for Ireland in 
December 2010 from the European Union, the European Central Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund (The Troika). 
This bailout was intended to lower the Irish government’s annual budget 
deficit to 3% of GDP. This is the maximum allowable annual deficit in Eu‑
rozone states. Immediately after the bailout, the Irish government developed 
a budget plan to meet this target. In the initial year of the budget, 2011, the 
government cut spending and raised taxes by €6 billion to trim the deficit. 
Overall, the government expected to enact a total of €15 billion in spending 
reductions and tax increases from 2011‑2015 with twice as many spending 
cuts as increased revenues (The National Recovery Plan 2010, 5, 9). After 
the first three government budgets have implemented these austerity policies, 
Ireland’s annual budget deficit is estimated to still be more than €15 billion 
in 2013 (Department of Finance 2012, 5). Thus, austerity has not worked 
as of yet to eliminate or dramatically curtail Ireland’s seemingly perennial 
large budget deficits and accumulating national debt. To further decrease 
future deficits, the Irish government faces continuing budget cuts and tax 
increases, at least for the next two years. Some of these cuts inevitably have 
come and will come from the social services the Irish government provides 
its citizens. Many have criticized the tendency for the costs of austerity to 
be borne by the marginalized in society who have seen government services 
reduced while the speculators, bond holders, and bankers have not had to 
pay their fair share for the damage they did to the economy (Habermas 2012, 
102‑103). The strain of reduced social welfare spending may undermine the 
social partnership process, especially for groups who were already relatively 
weak in this process (Ó Broin 2009). Other budget cuts in the pay of public 
sector workers are likely in the future as well. Many who work for the Irish 
government continue to have wages significantly higher than many of their 
counterparts in other European states (Reidy 2012). These reductions would 
come after earlier pay cuts have already been taken. The effect of these wage 
cuts among public sector employees means that in addition to austerity 
causing a difficult burden for the poor it is preventing an economic recovery. 
Reduced government spending is reducing demand and providing further 
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downward pressure on the Irish economy, lowering projected future growth 
and extending the recession. 
Based on being a poster‑child of austerity in the EU as well as the Irish 
government’s relentless effort to renegotiate the terms of its bailout (Kinsella 
2012), the government has been able to improve the terms of financing its 
long‑term debt in a deal reached with the European Central Bank in early 
February 2013. The corporation which had been created to liquidate the 
Anglo‑Irish bank debt that the Irish government had taken on with its promise 
in 2008 was itself dissolved. As a result, NAMA will have an expanded role 
in getting rid of debts, including those of Anglo. In addition, the short‑term 
promissory notes the Irish government had used to finance some of the bank 
debt are being replaced by long‑term sovereign bonds (Lane 2013). While this 
debt refinancing package will improve the ability of Ireland to manage its debt, 
it does little in the short‑run to reduce the continuing need for austerity with 
promises of continued spending cuts and increased tax revenues in the next 
two budgets. Estimates are that of the €5.1 billion in cuts and tax increases due 
to come in the next two years, the restructuring of existing debt will save only 
about €1 billion in cuts or tax hikes. Nevertheless, there are clear long‑term 
benefits to the recent deal reached by the Irish government and the European 
Central bank. By stretching out repayment of existing debt, the deal is likely 
to save the Irish government another €20 billion over the next decade (Beesley 
2013). This will make it easier for the government to convince investors to 
purchase Irish bonds and make the repayment of Irish debt more credible and 
with reduced interest payments. This will lower the long‑term cost of financing 
and paying off the debt for future Irish governments and tax payers. 
6. Putting the Irish Financial Crisis in Perspective
Much has been written about the recent financial crisis in Ireland, the bailout, 
and austerity policies. Most accounts of Ireland’s current economic challenges 
focus on the failure and questionable practices of banks, the decision by the 
Irish government to guarantee the debt accumulated by the Irish banks, the 
financial collapse, the international intervention to help the Irish manage 
this debt, and the austerity policies that have been put in place to try to get 
Ireland’s fiscal house in order. These recent economic developments need to 
be placed into a larger historical cultural and political context. The building 
boom was at least partially the result of a culture that had historically been 
preoccupied with property as a symbol of wealth. As the value of property 
accelerated in the early years of the new millennium, a frenzy of buying, 
building, and selling created a property bubble built on greed and materialist 
excess (O’Sullivan 2010, 11‑12). The values associated with the crisis were 
incubated in the 1980s as Irish young adults in this era became preoccupied 
with their material existence increasingly removed other worldly concerns that 
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had historically motivated a very Catholic Ireland. This has led Inglis (2006) to 
contend that Irish culture moved “from self‑denial to self‑indulgence.” Elliott 
(2009, 9) has argued that while the loss of old‑style Catholicism is not widely 
lamented in Ireland many are worried about the crude materialism and loss of 
values associated with the decline of the Catholic Church. Thus, the historic 
political culture that had promised frugal comfort has been replaced by a 
desire to define the ideal based on land, property, and material possessions.
In addition to this transformation of cultural values that were historically 
religiously defined or informed to social goods being defined in increasingly 
secular and materialist terms, there has also been a changed conception of the 
role of the individual in a political context. Cronin (2004, 211) has posited 
that once individuals are defined as consumers rather than citizens they lose 
their identity in the wake of globalization. Touraine (2013) contends that 
the economic crisis has further separated the economic life from the cultural 
and social experience. Kissane (2011, 136) argues that the financial crisis has 
triggered a second crisis of liberalism in Irish history. Vast social and economic 
changes have disconnected people from their government resulting in disil‑
lusionment with party politics, anger at corruption, and calls for major reform 
to the Irish political system. Increasingly, the state’s legitimacy itself is linked 
to the performance of the economy. Hence, the cultural changes that have 
come to Ireland best explain the economic outcomes we have witnessed15.
Politically, Fianna Fáil paid a great price in the general election of 2011 
as the public blamed it as the party in power before and during the financial 
crisis. Fine Gael has fared little better since assuming power with Labour in early 
2011. What is most surprising is that no new party has emerged to replace the 
dominant parties in Irish politics. This may suggest that the Irish political system 
has changed less due to the financial crisis than many had predicted and contin‑
ues to be characterized by remarkable stability (White 2011; McGraw 2012). 
As Fine Gael and Labour have faithfully implemented most of the previously 
agreed‑upon austerity policies, these parties have seen their support dissipate. 
Recent opinion polls show that Fianna Fáil has once again has emerged as the 
single most popular party in Ireland. While it is too early to tell the political 
fate of the party most hold responsible for the financial debacle in Ireland, it is 
obvious that no new force has emerged to offer a different vision for Ireland in 
the twenty‑first century. There is no party or political leader offering a vision to 
transform Irish policies with values that are in concert with the modern reali‑
ties of Ireland and in concert with values the Irish seek to maintain or preserve 
from their heritage and traditions. The only exception to this may be President 
Michael D. Higgins who when campaigning for the Presidency in 2011 spoke 
of the need to renew the Republic (Higgins 2011). 
Thus, the problems the Irish confront today are not just technical eco‑
nomic ones. The property bubble that led developers and mortgage holders to 
take on too much debt, financed by questionable loans made by Irish financial 
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institutions, and supported by Irish government policy resulted from a value 
system that motivated the hysteria for wealth and accumulation of property. 
Most popular accounts focus on the failures of economic and political policies 
resulting in the financial and fiscal crisis in Ireland (Allen 2009; McDonald, 
Sheridan, 2009; Murphy, Devlin 2009; Ó Dálaigh, 2009; O’Toole, 2009; 
Ross 2009; O’Toole 2010; Soden 2010; Carswell 2011; Cooper 2011). 
Despite the recession, bailout, and austerity, it would be unwise to dismiss 
the economic policies that proved successful in creating much of the growth 
in Ireland of the past two decades but became threatened in the 2000s by a 
refusal to focus on innovation and instead rely on speculation in land and 
housing (Ó Riain 2008). Notwithstanding the debt and continuing budget 
crisis, Ireland’s long‑term economic prognosis is not as bad as it might now 
appear because it has sought to take advantage of opportunities in the era of 
globalization. Instead of perceiving global capitalism as a threat, the develop‑
mental network approach to Irish economic policy has allowed the Irish to 
take advantage of the growing fluidity of capital and the ability to produce 
for global markets. This is the means by which the Irish have been able to 
embed liberal economic policies and make globalization work for them16. 
Moreover, Irish economic policies have connected domestic firms with for‑
eign multinationals, deepening capitalist growth and preventing Ireland from 
becoming an export platform. Foreign investment has tended to provide jobs 
in the high tech sectors disproportionately benefiting highly skilled workers17. 
This may account for the perceived inequality associated with globalization 
as those who work in high tech export sectors have been seen their jobs and 
incomes much more stable than those in the public and construction sectors 
of the Irish economy18.
Despite pressure from European governments (Basinger, Hallerberg 
2004), the Irish government remains committed to a low corporate tax rate 
of 12.5% and has refused to budge on this issue because this low tax rate 
is believed to be a major incentive for international investment that fuels 
long‑term economic growth. Foreign investment has been critical to provid‑
ing the capital necessary for economic growth in Ireland. In 2008 and 2009, 
Ireland’s exports decreased, but large trade surpluses continued because imports 
fell more sharply than exports. Exports rebounded in 2010 and 2011 so that 
exports are now more than 9% higher than when the recession began in 2007 
(see Figure 3). Thus, exports continue to be a successful means of promoting 
economic growth in Ireland which might help finance the burden of debt 
created by the property bubble and the government takeover of the banks. 
In sum, the Irish have successfully developed policies that have attracted for‑
eign investment and are aware that these policies should continue to provide 
economic growth in the future. But correct or wise economic policies need to 
be accompanied by a new value system that corrects the excesses of individual 
greed and the material expression of one’s worth.
106 timothy j. white
This article has argued that the Irish recession and fiscal crisis can best 
be explained not just by the collapse of the construction and financial sectors 
of the Irish economy but by appreciating what brought about the building 
boom and bust. One must appreciate the materialist excesses of the Celtic 
Tiger. Few, if any, advocate a return to this period of crass consumerism. While 
most appreciate the problems that created the downfall of the Celtic Tiger, 
few have offered a coherent vision of an Irish nation in the XXI century that 
lives up to its obligations but does not do so without considering what cul‑
ture or ideology should drive national politics in the future. If one looks too 
critically at the Irish elites and mass public in the most recent past, one can 
be left with a cynicism that paralyzes one’s ability to see beyond the present 
challenges and difficulties (Boland 2012). Perhaps what is needed in Ireland 
is a modest but achievable set of goals and policies that may not yield mas‑
sive short‑term gains but are more effective in the long run (Kinsella, Lyons 
2011, 66). This will require a patience and discipline that is fundamentally 
different from the materialism and short‑sightedness that characterized Irish 
culture and policy‑making in the later years of the Celtic Tiger. 
Notes
1 The standard view of Ireland’s peripheral development in Europe is found in Cunliffe 
(2001). Di Martino (2003) contends that the Roman Empire did incorporate Ireland and 
therefore Ireland was influenced significantly by Roman civilization.
2 One economic historian characterizes the performance of the Irish economy after 
independence as a “rocky road”; see Ó Gráda (1997).
3 Cowen (2002) refers to this general process as “creative destruction” as globalization 
impacts local cultures. Cerny, Menz, Soederberg (2005) claim that globalization inevitably inte‑
grates peoples in a world quite distinct from the more parochial environment that preceded it.
4 This state’s role in leading and directing economic development among those states who 
have historically “backward” economies or who are classified as late developers is stressed by 
Gerschenkron (1962). For a more recent analysis of the importance of the state in the economic 
development of states, see Schmidt (2009). 
5 The Irish experience conforms to the general finding that the political capacity of the 
state interacts with the open market policies of the state to determine the level of foreign direct 
investment (Coan, Kugler 2008). 
6 The importance of women in the labor force in Ireland has been emphasized by Arrow 
(1997, 2‑3) in his analysis of the Irish economy.
7 Suárez (2005) argues that while government policy has promoted the Irish language 
Ireland has remained an overwhelmingly English speaking nation.
8 Millar (2008) makes a similar argument.
9 This concept of moral monopoly is borrowed from Inglis (1998).
10 Ross and Webb (2012) claim that the cronyism and corruption in Ireland goes far 
beyond a few developers and Fianna Fáil politicians but is embedded in Irish culture. Their 
earlier work (Ross, Webb 2010) highlighted how a lack of transparency and accountability 
allowed economic and political elites get away with wasteful spending and projects. Solutions 
to Ireland’s difficulties are often linked to the need to overcome public sector inefficiency and 
corruption (Campbell 2010, 8‑9; Collins 2013).
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11 It has long been recognized that the major incentive for politicians is reelection, and 
they pursue policies in government to achieve that goal. See Mayhew (2004). This meant that as 
government revenue increased so did government spending. Thus, much like the rest of society 
the government came to believe that its revenues were likely to continue increase rapidly and it 
could afford ever expansive social welfare and other commitments (Kinsella, Lyons 2011, 72‑73).
12 See Kelly (2010) for a recent analysis of the credit bubble.
13 Moene (2011) has argued that sometimes political elites, motivated by satisfying the 
public good, choose policies that may maximize their popularity or survival but are not in the 
long‑term public good, even in open competitive polities. One should not assume the crony 
capitalism or a process whereby politicians made policies that benefitted special or certain groups 
in society in unique to Ireland. The challenge of effective corporate governance is perennial for 
all states. See Gourevitch, Shinn (2005).
14 Globalization’s tendency to create processes that are not held accountable by existing 
levels of regional and global governance is explained in Keohane (2003).
15 This argument is built on the contention of Eckstein (1988) that cultural changes are 
the source of political change.
16 The challenge is to make globalization work and not undermine social traditions and 
civil society. For this argument see Ruggie (2003).
17 This reality is that Ireland conforms to research in the labor markets in other national 
contexts. See Pandyi (2010). This tendency contradicts the more general argument that glo‑
balization and the flow of capital internationally undermines incomes while providing for 
growth. See Spence (2011).
18 For the general argument that globalization increases wealth but it is unequally shared 
by different sectors of the society, see Wade (2003, 32‑39) and Muller (2013).
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